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DOES THE CONSTITUTION
CARE ABOUT COERCIVE
FEDERAL FUNDING?*
Kingman Brewster**
I CHOSE AS my topic the Constitution's concern, or lack of con-
cern, about the coercive use of federal funding. It might have
read, in the vernacular of law review jargon, "The American Bar
Foundation Revisited." In 1975 1 gave a talk to the American Bar
Foundation entitled "The Constitution is Dead, Long Live the
Constitution!"' It was a somewhat abrasive expression of concern
about the "covert regulation" imposed on universities by attach-
ment of conditions to federal grants, contracts, loans, and
guarantees.
Those times still were under the shadow of the "enemies"
paranoia of the Nixon Administration. It was not fanciful to im-
agine the withdrawal of federal support for vindictive political
ends--the threatened cutoff of funds to nonconformist opponents
of Administration policy. Indeed, it was reported that some vin-
dictive White House zealots had sought to persuade the science-
funding agencies to cut off the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy because its President, Jerome K. Wiesner, opposed the an-
tiballistic missile program. Just as Treasury Secretary George
Shultz stonewalled efforts to use tax returns to harass "enemies,"
so too the science-funding bureaucracy refused to carry out the
* The text of this Article, with minor changes, was delivered as the Sumner Canary
Lecture, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Cleveland, Ohio, October 6,
1983.
** Resident partner, London office, Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, New
York City.
1. Delivered to the American Bar Foundation, Chicago, February 22, 1975 (printed
in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF YALE 1974-75, at 17-24).
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White House suggestion. This seemingly incredible request be-
came all too plausible in the wake of the Watergate hearings.
Indeed, President Nixon's reelection committee, better known
as CREEP (The Committee to Reelect the President), recognized
that the private as well as the so-called independent sector de-
pended greatly on government largesse. The committee capital-
ized on this relationship by engaging in what I would call the
"shakedown" approach to fundraising.
Well short of such nightmares and caricatures, however, was,
and is, my conviction that there ought to be much more concern,
political as well as legal, about permitting the withdrawal of eligi-
bility for federal assistance to be used as a regulatory device. Ob-
viously those dependent upon government generosity are
reluctant to bite the hand they hope will feed them. It is not easy
to persuade even the stoutest of hearts in the strongest of universi-
ties to challenge policies from which they benefit. The "independ-
ent sector" is not all that independent.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FUND CUTOFF SANCTION
The fund cutoff sanction is perhaps best illustrated in the area
of "affirmative action." These programs, requiring not only non-
discrimination but affirmative measures to remedy the heritage of
racial and gender disadvantage,2 were the most burdensome and
obtrusive policies utilizing the sanction. They carried with them a
particularly strong inhibition to constitutional objection, for men
and women of good will did not want to be seen thwarting policies
whose goals they ardently believed in. At the same time, the ad-
ministrative burdens which affirmative action imposes, and the in-
herent contradictions in a policy which advocates "special efforts"
but no "preferences" based on race or sex, is, to say the least, awk-
ward for both regulators and their victims. The programs entailed
interminable negotiations with a series of federal officials, usually
at the regional level, who were entirely unable to deal adequately
with the hundreds of institutions within their area. When respon-
sibility for administration of the policy shifted from the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare to the Labor
Department, a whole new problem arose. People who had previ-
2. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); Exec. Order No.
11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e (1976).
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ously worked in commercial or industrial contexts had to be intro-
duced to the unique folkways of academe.
Faculties and even boards of trustees were widely and deeply
split, depending on their attitude toward federal intrusion on the
one hand and the strength of their feeling about doing something
to correct gender and racial discrimination on the other. Then, of
course, there were the followers of Sidney Hook,3 who were out-
raged by the tendency toward "reverse discrimination" which they
felt was implicit in the whole concept of "affirmative action."
Quite apart from this swirling riptide of conflicting values and
emotions, there was no doubt in my mind that policies designed to
further basic constitutional values did not offer the best launching
pad for a challenge to the constitutional validity of what I would
call "covert regulation" through the threat of withdrawal of fed-
eral funds.
At last an optimal context for a constitutional challenge was
offered. Congressman Rogers of Florida had been pressured by
constituents whose sons and daughters had failed to gain admis-
sion to American medical schools. In order to pursue their quest
for a medical doctorate, these sons and daughters enrolled abroad,
heavily concentrated in Bologna, Italy and Guadalajara, Mexico.
Congressman Rogers introduced a proviso to the Health Man-
power legislation, which required medical schools wishing to hold
on to their federal capitation grants (that is, grants for general
purposes measured by the number of students enrolled) to agree
to take whatever number of American students wishing to transfer
from foreign medical schools as might be designated by the Secre-
tary of Health, Education, and Welfare.4
This requirement, unlike the affirmative action programs, was
not in pursuit of a public purpose, let alone a constitutional pur-
pose. It was legislation designed to favor a particular private
group. It seemed to provide the ideal opportunity for persuading
the federal courts to focus on the constitutional issues. It gave
them a chance to constrain the free-wheeling way in which the
threatened forfeiture of federal money was frequently used to co-
erce compliance with objectives unrelated to the purpose for
which the grant was given.
3. See S. HOOK, PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY 138-50 (1980).
4. Health Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1976, § 502, Pub. L. No. 94-484,
90 Stat. 2293 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 295f-l(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981)) (ad-
ding § 77 1(b)(3) to Public Health Service Act). The capitation grants are authorized by 42
U.S.C. § 295f (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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Stanford, the Hopkins, and Harvard joined Yale in a collective
attack on the constitutionality of the Rogers amendment. Of
course we all wanted to find some procedural way to challenge
this matter without forfeiting the funds. Our joint choice of coun-
sel was Phillip A. Lacovara. He thought there might be some way
of pursuing a declaratory judgment without having to forfeit the
capitation grant. However, that procedural ingenuity was never
tested. The offending amendment was withdrawn before the case
was filed. The federal courts never had a chance to face the ques-
tion of the constitutional limits, if any, on the use of federal fund
cutoffs to achieve an unrelated purpose to aid a private group.
By that time I had left Yale for happy ambassadorial exposure
to the contrasts between a system of parliamentary supremacy and
our system of written constitutional constraints on both executive
and legislative power, made effective by the right of judicial
review.
Before my first year in London had come to an end, my atten-
tion was drawn to the British Government's attempted use of the
fund cutoff sanction to secure compliance with its wishes. Prime
Minister Callaghan and Chancellor of the Exchequer Dennis
Healy attempted to coerce recalcitrant companies into compliance
with executive wage norms which had been determined by the
Cabinet but which had not been the subject of parliamentary en-
actment or even debate in the House.
As a very green ambassador and a thoroughly obsolete law
professor, I was so bold as to instruct the Society of Public Teach-
ers of Law in Great Britain that such executive free-wheeling
without legislative authorization was unthinkably unthinkable
under the United States Constitution.5 I repeated the same com-
ment on constitutional contrast at the closing dinner address of
the American Law Institute in Washington in 1978.6
Imagine my surprise when shortly thereafter I opened the
morning paper to read that my President had issued an executive
order withdrawing eligibility for government contracts from any
firm refusing to comply with Professor Kahn's wage and price
"norms."7 I still thought it was unconstitutional. So did the Dis-
5. Brewster, The Rule of Law and The Voluntary Society, 14 J. Soc'Y PUB. TCHRS. OF
L. 286 (1979).
6. Brewster, Address to the American Law Institute, Friday Evening Session, May 19,
1978, 55 A.L.I. PROc. 505, 511 (1978).
7. Exec. Order No. 12,092, 3 C.F.R. 249 (1978), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,288,
3 C.F.R. 125 (1981), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1982).
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trict Court for the District of Columbia, in the person of Judge
Barrington D. Parker, when the AFL-CIO brought an action
against Professor Kahn' seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
The court ruled that in issuing the Executive Order, President
Carter had acted "without statutory authority" and exceeded per-
missible constitutional limits.9
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed. 10
President Carter's Order was upheld on the ground that it was
based on a broad presidential power to regulate all government
procurement policies, authorized by the Procurement Act of
19491-a statute arising from the Concluding Report of Hoover's
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
Government. 12
Speaking through Judge Skelley Wright, a majority of five
found that the President's authority to promote effective and effi-
cient procurement policies and procedures justified the imposition
of wage and price norms as a condition of eligibility for a govern-
ment contract in excess of a stated figure. Needless to say, this
extraordinary stretch of the statute has excited considerable criti-
cism, not only from two dissenting judges but from commentators
as well. 3 But that question need not detain us here. For purposes
of my argument, it is enough to note that everyone, including the
government attorney, agreed that if there were no adequate statu-
tory basis for the order it would fail on constitutional grounds. 4
The threshold question for anyone who feels unjustly dealt
with when funds are withdrawn for noncompliance with some
condition is how to overcome the court's reluctance to entertain
the action at all. First, there is the notion that no one has a
8. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979). Professor Kahn was President Carter's Chief Ad-
ministrator of the Council on Wage Price Stability at the time.
9. Id. at 90.
10. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915
(1979).
11. Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-152, 63
Stat. 377 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 40, 44 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. V
1981)).
12. Kahn, 618 F.2d at 787 n.15.
13. See, e.g., Note, Judicial Review of Executive Action in Domestic Actions, 80
COLtJM. L. REv. 1535, 1550-51 (1980); Comment, Using FederalProcurement to Fightlnfla-
tion: AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 93 HARV. L. REv. 793 (1980).
14. See Kahn, 618 F.2d at 787. As support for this proposition, the court cited the
failure of President Truman's steel seizure action to pass constitutional muster. Id. (citing
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
1983]
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"right" to do business with the government. Or, in the words of
Perkins v. Lukens Steel, "the Government enjoys the unrestricted
power. . . to determine those with whom it will deal, and to fix
the terms and conditions .... 15
So the complainant may lack standing to sue. Even if he keeps
his foot in the judicial door, he will face, as in Lukens Steel, judi-
cial deference to a broad official discretion. 6 However, these bar-
riers to standing seem, in the words of Judge Wright, to have
"withered." 7
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE?
Assuming that there is a valid statutory basis for the imposed
condition, does that end the constitutional matter? What constitu-
tional inhibitions might constrain even an explicit legislative man-
date to withhold or withdraw funds if various requirements are
not met?
The first plausible question is whether the condition must be
rationally related to the purpose for which the contract, grant,
loan, or guaranty is made. It is the familiar test of pertinence and
reasonableness. Or, as it sometimes seems, is it enough to say that
the government is paying for the work it assists so it can attach
any conditions it wants, whether or not they seem rationally re-
lated to the underlying contract or grant? This does seem to be
the rationale of the Lukens case. There, Congress imposed the re-
quirement that any contractor with the federal government had to
pay wages no lower than the average minimum wage paid to
workers in his area. It was an effort to set minimum wages for
government contractors as a supplement to the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, which set minimum wages in interstate commerce
generally.
The petitioner did not seem to argue that the condition was
unconstitutional because it had no reasonable relevance to the un-
derlying contract, but instead argued, in the spirit of those primi-
tive anti-New Deal days, that all citizens had a sort of free market
right to deal with their government without obstruction. It was
this line of argument which apparently provoked the ringing rhet-
oric about the government's right to choose with whom it will
15. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940).
16. Id. at 125.
17. Kahn, 618 F.2d at 794 n.55. Judge Wright noted that despite the breakdown of
standing barriers, the government's power to contract as enuciated by the Perkins Court
remained viable. Id.
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deal, and on what conditions. In addition, any charge of unfair-
ness was tempered by the elaborate hearings which the Secretary
of Labor was required to hold in her determination of what was
an average minimum wage in the area.
The petitioners had no basis on which to complain that they
had been deprived of procedural due process.' For the same rea-
son, they could not claim excessive delegation of legislative power,
since both the standards and the procedures for their exercise were
set forth with some particularity. Nevertheless, the statute did,
and was intended to, expand the scope of federal minimum wage
regulation by reaching those contracting with the government who
might not be reached by the basic minimum wage law. Given the
doubts about the scope of the commerce clause in those days,
from a political point of view this was a sensible supplement to the
federal reach. Also, of course, there was a plausible line of argu-
ment that the federal interest in the quality of the work performed
provided a rational basis for setting minimum wages to those per-
forming it. This somewhat casuistic argument never surfaced,
however, since the claim that "the government can set any condi-
tions it wants" sufficed.
III. INDIRECT LEGISLATION
This brings us to the second line of plausible constitutional in-
quiry: Can Congress regulate by indirection what it could not
regulate by direction? By this I mean can it impose requirements
on federal contractors, grantees, and borrowers which it could not
impose by direct regulation?
I have already suggested that activity can be reached under
Lukens which could not be reached by the direct regulation of
interstate commerce. Given the attentuation of the commerce
clause for regulatory purposes, this is no longer a wide margin of
expansion afforded by the federal dollar. But what about the sub-
stance of regulation? A fine example is found in Senator Buck-
ley's imposition of a requirement of disclosure of records to
students where the educational institution, primary, secondary, or
higher, is receiving federal funds. 18
At first blush I would doubt whether warrant could be found
18. Family Educational Privacy Act of 1974, § 513, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); see Comment, The
Federal Constitutional Spending Power: A Searchfor Limits, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 293, 310-17
(1975).
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in the Constitution for legislation directly regulating access to stu-
dent records in local schools, colleges, and universities. Yet it was
possible for Senator Buckley to attach such a condition to federal
aid to education by amendment introduced on the floor without
any prior hearings. It sailed through both houses substantially
without debate. It later caused considerable consternation when it
was found to dry up sources of credible, candid letters of recom-
mendation to college, graduate, and professional school admis-
sions officers. By interpretation, the access to records which
Buckley provided was assumed by some institutions to be subject
to waiver if the student desired. Amendment to that effect was
later passed on Senator Buckley's initiative.
Or take another example. Happily, it never reached legislative
maturity, but Senator Edward Kennedy once proposed that the
best way to achieve a better distribution of medical doctors, par-
ticularly to serve the urban and rural poor, was to threaten to
withdraw or withhold the so-called capitation grant to medical
schools.' 9 They would lose their grants if they did not designate a
stated proportion of each graduating class to serve in areas where
doctors were in short supply as determined by the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare. It would have been a blatant
attempt to make the schools draft some proportion of their stu-
dents for involuntary service, presumably by lot, if persuasion
failed. Were it not for the cash nexus of the capitation grant, one
might wonder whether the Constitution would support such a re-
quirement if imposed by direct mandatory regulation. Happily
this did not come to pass. But you can imagine the chill that it sent
up the spines of college presidents and medical deans.
For the purposes of my argument, the Kennedy proposal and
the Buckley amendment serve to highlight the question of whether
the scope of constitutionally permissible federal regulation is dif-
ferent when the sanction is the withdrawal of federal funds rather
than the imposition of fines or administrative penalties.
IV. LIMITS OF DELEGATION
A third constitutional constraint which is obviously and tradi-
tionally relevant to the constitutionality of direct regulation is the
limitation on the permissible scope of discretion which Congress
19. The proposal is found in Senator Kennedy's speech of December 2, 1974, deliv-
ered at the Yale Medical Center. See 48 YALE J. BIOL. & MEDICINE 1 (1975) (report of
speech).
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can delegate to the Executive. The basic milestones are familiar
to all students of constitutional law. Limits on legislative delega-
tion played an important part in the judicial veto of the National
Industrial Recovery Act.2' There, however, was broad delegation
to private code-making authorities, with little official supervision
and no right of appeal.2 1 When comparable economy-wide regu-
lation was challenged in the Yakus case against the Office of Price
Administration in World War II, the statutory arrangement was
upheld.22 A somewhat wishful Court found sufficient guidelines
and standards in the admittedly vague legislative charges. Per-
haps more importantly, the statute sought to protect the law's vic-
tims against abuse of discretion by providing channels of appeal,
culminating in the special Court of Price Appeals drawn from a
panel of federal circuit court judges. Still, many commentators
read Yakus to ring the death knell on the doctrine of limits on
legislative delegation.' The requirement of legislative specificity,
however, took on new life in National Cable Television Association
v. United States, where, in order to avoid constitutional doubts
about the breadth of legislative delegation, the Court construed
the statute more narrowly.24
The recent judicial rejection of the legislative veto on constitu-
tional grounds25 would seem to indicate that the Court is still sen-
sitive to the separation of powers as a serious element of
constitutional scruple. Also, by implication, striking down the
power of legislative veto imposes, as a practical matter, higher
standards of initial consideration and precision in the drafting of
legislation. In short, legislative buck-passing will not be as easy as
it was with the legislative veto. By the same token, of course, it
may inhibit congressional willingness to act at all in some areas.
But the issue here is not to determine the pulse or blood pres-
sure of the legislative delegation doctrines in the area of direct
regulation, but to determine to what extent they are alive and well
20. See Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The National
Industrial Recovery Act, passed to encourage economic recovery, gave the President wide
discretion to act in whatever manner he deemed necessary to effecuate the policies underly-
ing the law. Id. at 537-38. The Court held such a delegation of legislative power to the
Executive unconstitutional. Id. at 541-42.
21. Professor Jaffe emphasized this point in his classic article, .4n Essay on Delegation
of Legislative Power: II, 47 COLuM. L. REV. 561 (1947).
22. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944).
23. See Kahn, 618 F.2d at 791 n.51 (citing I K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA-
TISE 149-223 (2d ed. 1978)).
24. 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1973).
25. Immigration & Naturaliz. Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
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when regulation is indirect. That is, do they apply when the regu-
lation is sought to be accomplished by withholding the federal
financial carrot rather than applying the federal punitive stick.
This question was raised by Judge MacKinnon in his thought-
ful dissent inAFL-CIO v. Kahn.26 There, even if the statute was
construed to comprehend the setting of wage norms, there was ab-
solutely no standard set, no guidelines, and no procedure for re-
view. In short, even the minimal standards of legislative guidance
and procedural protection were lacking.
Lack of legislative guidelines, in fact, was one of the most ex-
asperating aspects of the enforcement of affirmative action as a
condition of receiving educational support. The Executive Order
was vague, as was the enabling statute.28 The regulatory agen-
cies, first the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and
later the Department of Labor, spent considerable time and
anguish developing guidelines in an attempt to secure compliance
by more institutions than they could possibly reach with individ-
ual investigations. In a conscientious effort to avoid the imposi-
tion of quotas which the Executive Order seemed to forbid, but in
an equally well-intentioned effort to require more than "business
as usual," they evolved the ambiguous substitute of "goals and
targets." Then, in pursuit of these fuzzy objectives, schools, col-
leges, and universities were asked to frame statistical goals for
their faculty recruitment policies. All the while we were reassured
by Washington; we, in turn, tried to reassure our faculty depart-
ments and schools that we did not expect a double standard. Al-
though I do remember one conversation with a Labor Department
representative who let slip the remark "a black woman counts
twice!" Even that inherently contradictory standard or guideline
was not laid down by Congress.
I do not fault the enforcement agencies. In a way, I do not
fault Congress. They wanted more than nondiscrimination, but
they did not want "reverse discrimination." The delicate nature
of the issues provided a natural invitation to buck-passing. And,
as every presiding officer knows, when you are sitting on top it is
called "delegation." Down the line it is called buck-passing.
There appears to be no limit to legislative delegation when com-
pliance is sought by the imposition of conditions rather than by
26. 618 F.2d at 797-815.
27. See supra note 3.
28. See id
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direct regulation. This seems to me one of the paramount un-
resolved constitutional issues in the area of regulation by with-
holding the federal carrot.
V. INTERPRETING THE STATUTE
Finally, there is the question of canons of construction. It has
long been a truism to say that laws are to be construed narrowly if
a broader construction would raise constitutional doubts. This
was recently reiterated by the Supreme Court in National Cable
Television Association v. United States in order to avoid the ques-
tion of the possibly unconstitutional breadth of the legislative del-
egation.2 9 Does this canon apply when the regulatory power is
exercised by conditioning the eligibility for federal funds rather
than by overt regulatory exercise of the police power? This ques-
tion, too, seems to remain unanswered.
Another canon of statutory interpretation is that a criminal
law is to be construed narrowly. I have always assumed that this
is for three reasons. First, it is out of respect for fairness to the
law's victims. They have a right to be informed with definiteness
and certainty as to what is permitted and what is forbidden. Sec-
ond, it is to give a reviewing body some clear guidance in deter-
mining whether the prosecuting authority has overstepped the
bounds of his mandate. Third, perhaps it is a specially useful and
warranted discipline on the legislature. It tells Congress that if
they mean to impose the awful sanction of the criminal law, they
had better be careful, not careless; precise, not ambiguous; scrupu-
lous, not casual.
Do either or both of these canons of construction apply when
the regulatory sanction is not penal in form, but is rather the eco-
nomic sanction of withholding or withdrawing federal financial
support?
The district court in AFL-CIO v. Kahn had no doubt about
the mandatory, coercive nature of the sanction imposed on those
who became ineligible for government contracts because they
would not abide by President Carter's wage and price "norms."30
The government argued that
[o]f course, firms that do not observe the standards will be un-
able to bid on government contracts or first-tier subcontracts in
excess of $5 million. This may or may not be an important
29. 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1973).
30. 472 F. Supp. at 99-100.
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consideration for an individual company. In any event, no
company has a legal right to a government contract, and none
can be heard to complain if it voluntarily takes actions which
the company, on balance, believes to be advantageous, but
which renders it ineligible for certain government contracts.31
Judge Parker replied tartly: "For the defendants to urge this posi-
tion is simply to blink at reality. . . . It would be difficult to
convince a business executive or anyone faced with a decision to
comply or lose a substantial government contract that such a pro-
gram is voluntary. 32
Judge Robb in his dissent on appeal was even more succinct
when he said: "Contractors who fail to comply are threatened
with the loss of contracts for the payment of millions, perhaps
hundreds of millions of dollars. No amount of sophisticated or
metaphysical argument can convince me that compliance under
threat of massive economic sanctions is voluntary.
33
Judicial alertness to the realities rather than the form of regu-
lation by the imposition of coercive conditions is not new. Thus,
in Frost & Frost Trucking Co. the Supreme Court said that the
state could not do indirectly what it could not do directly.34 It
noted:
If so, constitutional guaranties, so carefully safeguarded against
direct assault, are open to destruction by the indirect but no less
effective process of requiring a surrender, which, though, in
form voluntary, in fact lacks none of the elements of compul-
sion. . . . In reality, the [victim] is given no choice, except a
choice between the rock and the whirlpool, - an option to
forego a privilege which may be vital to his livelihood or sub-
mit to a requirement which may constitute an intolerable
burden.
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of
state legislation which, by words of express divestment, seeks to
strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitu-
tion, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accom-
plished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for
a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to with-
hold. It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a
general rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege alto-
gether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to im-
pose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited;
and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions
31. Id. at 101.
32. Id.
33. 618 F.2d at 816-17.
34. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926).
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which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the
state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a
condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surren-
der of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the
Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out
of existence. 3
5
It will not surprise you that I have a special sensitivity to the
activities of thought, assembly, and expression which are them-
selves the subject of special constitutional protection. Academic
freedom and institutional self-determination rely on all three.
There is even some suggestion in the eloquent words of Justice
Frankfurter in the Sweezy case that the freedom of universities
themselves are the subject of special constitutional concern.36
If, for example, Congress were to legislate that federal assist-
ance funds were not to be available to any institution which per-
mitted classroom criticism of the doctrines of Milton Friedman
(or Maynard Keynes, for that matter), I have no doubt that this
would be stricken down as an unconstitutional condition. That
such a condition is unimaginably unimaginable is a fair sign of
the health of the Republic. The Constitution is good politics!
However, the broader and far more practical question is
whether constitutional alertness should be more sensitive when
academic life and institutions are involved than when state, mu-
nicipal, or private commercial activity is sought to be made to
conform to federal dictates. Is there a special constitutional sanc-
tuary for the academy? I would suggest that there is. Chief Jus-
tice Warren, speaking for the plurality of his colleagues in the
Sweezy case, dealt more explicitly with the special value to society
of staying the hand of government intrusion into the life of the
academy:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underesti-
mate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who
guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon
the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would
imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so
thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot
yet be made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences,
where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes....
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding;
35. Id.
36. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262-63 (1957) (concurring opinion).
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otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.37
Does the special sensitivity to the fragile life of the free academy
invoke special constitutional inhibitions when government seeks
to impose broad mandates as a condition of its bounty?
I would argue that such considerations tip the scales when a
court is asked to interpret ambiguous statutory or administrative
language. Whether a condition attaching to programs or activities
supported by federal funds makes the entire institution subject to
compliance has been the subject of litigation with results which
seem to conflict.3' The Grove City College case,39 now pending in
the Supreme Court, of course raises an even more remote federal
nexus. There, the institution, which refused to sign a pledge of
compliance with Title IX (gender discrimination) because it re-
ceived no federal funds, was told by the Department of Education
that students receiving government grants or guaranteed loans
would have to forfeit their federal subvention if they attended
Grove City.
The constitutional issue arises not in the form of alleged un-
constitutionality of the condition, but in the guise of statutory in-
terpretation. It is not implausible to argue that when dealing with
universities and students, freedom of choice with respect to each
other is a sound basis from which it is possible to assert a prefer-
ence for a narrow construction of any statute which would inter-
fere with such private choices. Far be it from me to prescribe the
outcome of a case pending before the High Court! But I do say
that these issues have a great deal more to do with the quality of
our pluralistic society and our government's accountability to a
rule of law than they are popularly perceived to have.
A recent study by the Urban Institute40 reveals, somewhat to
37. Id. at 250.
38. See Rice v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D.
Va. 1982).
39. Grove City College v. Hams, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982). On February 28, 1984,
the Supreme Court decided Grove City College v. Bell, 52 U.S.L.W. 4283 (1984). The
Court held that Title IX applies to Grove City College since some of its students receive
federally-funded Basic Educational Opportunity Grants. Id. at 4287. As such, the Court
concluded that the Department of Education may demand an Assurance of Compliance
with Title IX regarding the College's administration of the federal financial assistance pro-
gram. Id at 4289. However, most significantly, the scope of the decision was program-
specific, for the Court declined to implement Title IX coverage on an institution-wide ba-
sis. Id at 4288.
40. L. SALAMON & A. ABRAMSON, THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE NON-PROFrr
SECTOR (1982).
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my surprise, that the so-called independent sector is far more de-
pendent on government than it is on private sources of financing.
Of course this is in large part because of the growth of government
support over the postwar years of social and community as well as
educational and health care programs. It is also interesting to
note that some spokesmen for independent institutions have con-
fessed a preference for government funding rather than private
funding. Also, journalistic comment indicates that the ideological
motivation has led to some of the selective, crippling cutbacks of
support of independent institutions, especially those assisting mi-
norities and those felt to be leftward leaning.41 So the problem of
covert regulation and the coercive potential of the threatened
withdrawal of funds remains very much alive in the so-called in-
dependent sector.
However, it is also my belief, not statistically documented, that
the shadow of covert regulation is now cast more widely on the so-
called private sector than ever before. It is hard to come by statis-
tics, since most economic description slices the economy with a
bright line differentiating between the public and the private sec-
tors. What I am talking about, however, is the extent to which the
industry or the service, although performed by the private sector,
is in whole or in part dependent upon public support. In the case
of procurement this is easy, and is dramatically illustrated and an-
alyzed in countless studies beginning with Eli Ginzberg's 42 in the
sixties. However, in the case of other subsidies, especially those
that are "off-budget," such as loan guaranties, measurement of the
scope of dependence on government is not as simple. It is fair to
say, however, that the potential for covert regulation is far more
pervasive than is the incidence of direct regulation.
Now, I submit, we are well beyond the threshold of the pub-
licly dependent private economy. The so-called independent sec-
tor is particularly vulnerable, since it cannot pass on its costs to
the customers when the government imposes new requirements.
Financial dependence is far more likely to describe the relation
between the citizen, including the corporate and institutional citi-
zen, and his government, than is the regulatory billy club. Yet we
are a long way from making discretionary federal spending power
subject to the rule of law.
Under President Wilson's New Freedom, and later under
41. See Saasta, Tying Charity's Hands, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1983, at A19, col. 2.
42. E. GINZBERG, G. HIESTAND & B. RUEBENS, THE PLURALISTIC ECONOMY (1965).
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President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, the regulatory state was
born and evolved. With it doctrines of administrative law evolved
to try to trim the balance between administrative necessity in the
face of enlarged government responsibility for the public interest
on the one hand, and claims of fairness and redress for the citizen
against official abuse on the other. Administrative law was born
and took its place in law school curricula. Eventually, an attempt
was made to give it statutory form by the passage of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.43 Champions hailed that Act as a new
charter of freedom for the regulated. Opponents saw it as a
straightjacket which would stultify effective administration. It has
proved to be a little of both, but far from the euphoric expecta-
tions of its supporters or the calamitous howling of its opponents.
The Constitution may have been cabined by judicial deference
to legislative will and administrative discretion. But in letter as
well as in spirit, the values of constitutional government are more
sorely needed now than ever before as we try to find the right
balance between the needs of government and the claims of the
citizen in the era of the entitlement state.
43. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 7
U.S.C. (1982)).
[Vol. 34:1
